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 Stripping Away Employment Rights: 
The Unconscionability of Class 
Waivers in Employment Agreements 
Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
NIKKI CLARK* 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
In 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which established 
a public policy in favor of arbitration.1  For the next six decades, courts undermined 
the FAA by not allowing arbitration for federal statutory claims through the nonar-
bitrability doctrine.2  Not until the 1980s did the Supreme Court reversed its stance 
on arbitration and began to require arbitration under the FAA for certain federal 
statutory claims.3 
As support for arbitration clauses began to grow, employers began to include 
arbitration clauses in employment agreements because it lowers the cost and uncer-
tainty of litigation.4  Many of these arbitration clauses contain waivers of the right 
to class action.5  Recently, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, the United States Su-
preme Court held that the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit contracts from 
disallowing class-wide contracts.6 
The constitutionality of arbitration clauses in contracts did not end with Con-
cepcion.  Employment contracts that contain arbitration clauses are still an issue for 
the courts. In Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, the district court found that the arbitra-
tion clause included in the employment agreement was unconscionable.7  A case 
decided in Connecticut that involved the same employers found the arbitration 
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 1. Elizabeth A. Roma, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts and the Need for 
Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 522 (2004). 
 2. David Horton, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, Purposivism, and State Public Policy, 101 
GEO. L.J. 1217, 1232 (2013). For six decades, courts refused to compel arbitration of federal statutory 
claims. The nonarbitrability doctrine rested on the premise the litigation was superior to arbitration. Id. 
 3. Id. at 1233. See also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 
(1985) (holding that arbitrating a federal statutory claim did not mean the surrender of substantive rights 
but “trading the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, 
and expedition of arbitration.”). 
 4. Alexander J.S Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Recon-
figuration of Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L & PUB. POL’Y 581, 582-83 (2004). 
 5. Thomas G. Yoxall & Seth Roberts, Class Action Waiver Provisions, 39 ADVOC. (TEX.) 26, 26 
(2007). 
 6. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding that the Federal Arbitration Act 
preempts state laws that prohibit contracts form disallowing class-wide arbitration). 
 7. Id.  Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
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clause included in the employment agreement was not unconscionable.8 This Note 
discusses how courts have handled arbitration clauses in employment contracts and 
whether waivers of class and collective arbitration action are unconscionable.  A 
federal circuit court split currently exists concerning whether waivers of class and 
collective arbitration actions are unconscionable.  This Note argues that a waiver of 
collective action, whether express or unknowing, should be per se unconscionable 
to provide consistency and to resolve the inconsistency between and even within 
federal circuits. 
II.   FACTS AND HOLDING 
Jessica Herzfeld began working at the Gold Club, an exotic dance club in Penn-
sylvania, while she was in college in 2006.9  After she began working, Herzfeld 
signed an agreement but could not recall the subject or terms of the agreement and 
the managers who worked at the Gold Club when Herzfeld was first hired could not 
recall giving Herzfeld any paperwork to sign.10  The club owner, who claimed that 
Herzfeld signed an arbitration agreement when she first began working in 2006, 
alleged that a 2009 flood destroyed that agreement.11  Herzfeld continued working 
for four more years after the 2009 flood without a signed agreement.12  During this 
time period, Herzfeld also worked at other clubs.13 
On August 30, 2013, the Club presented Herzfeld with a new Stage Rental Li-
cense Agreement, which contained an arbitration agreement.14  This agreement was 
the subject of their dispute.15  Kristen Angelucci, a representative of the Gold Club, 
told Herzfeld that she could no longer work at the Gold Club if she did not sign the 
agreement.16  When asked to sign the document, Herzfeld asked if she could take 
the document home because she had already paid for her stage time and she wanted 
more time to review the document at home.17  Herzfeld was told that she could not 
take the document home, so she then quickly read over the document and signed 
it.18 
During Herzfeld’s time at the Gold Club, the owners classified all dancers that 
worked at the club as independent contractors instead of employees.19  Because the 
                                                          
 8. D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd., 789 F.Supp. 2d 308, 327-30 (2011) (holding that the arbitration clause 
was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable because the clause was located on the same page 
where the dancers signed their name and the dancers did not have unequal bargaining power). 
 9. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *1. 
 10. Id.  At trial, the owner of the Gold Club alleged that Herzfeld signed an arbitration agreement 
when she first began working.  Absent a signed document, the owner looked to its standard paperwork 
that is usually given to a new hire: an “Entertainer Information Sheet,” a “Commitment to a Drug Free 
Environment,” a “Stage Rental License Agreement,” and an “Entertainer’s Rules, Regulations, and 
Proper Conduct.” Absent the allegation by the club owner, there is no proof that any document Herzfeld 
signed before 2013 contained an arbitration clause.  Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at *2. 
 15. Herfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Complaint at *1, Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (No. 14-
4966). 
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dancers were classified as independent contractors, they were not paid the applica-
ble minimum wage under Pennsylvania law.20  Under this classification, dancers 
were also required to work in excess of 40 hours per week and were not paid for 
any overtime.21  Further, the Gold Club collected a portion of the dancers’ tips from 
customers.22 
Herzfeld filed a lawsuit under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) on 
behalf of herself and other similarly situated individuals.23  Herzfeld filed suit for 
unfair practices, seeking (1) unpaid minimum wages for hours worked for which 
the club owner did not pay the mandatory minimum wage, (2) unpaid overtime 
wages, and (3) liquidated damages.24  Herzfeld alleged that she and the other danc-
ers that worked at the Gold Club were employees under the FLSA.25  The Gold Club 
claimed it did not have to pay the dancers the mandated minimum wage as the club 
classified the dancers as independent contractors.26  Along with Herzfeld’s FLSA 
claim, Herzfeld also brought a class action suit in the United States District Court 
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania on behalf of all dancers who worked at the Gold 
Club in Pennsylvania.27  Herzfeld’s suit included a claim for unfair practices under 
the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act of 1968 and the Pennsylvania Wage Payment 
and Collection Law, claiming the Gold Club unfairly classified the dancers as inde-
pendent contractors instead of employees.28  Herzfeld’s suit also included a claim 
for unfair enrichment under Pennsylvania common law.29 
The Gold Club moved to compel arbitration or, in the alternative, stay the trial 
court proceeding on any claim not referred to arbitration.30  The district court 
granted both parties limited discovery on arbitrability.31  The court held that the 
arbitration clause was procedurally and substantively unconscionable, and thus un-
enforceable as it caused an unknowing loss of an individual’s statutory right to bring 
a collective or class arbitration action.32 
III.   LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Herzfeld’s claim raises important questions about unconscionability of arbitra-
tion clauses in employment contracts.  In 2011, the Supreme Court decided in AT&T 
Mobility v. Concepcion that the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit contracts 
from disallowing class-wide arbitration.33  Concepcion, however, dealt only with 
                                                          
 20. Id. at *1-2. 
 21. Id. at *2. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Complaint at *16, Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at *18. 
 28. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *2. 
 29. Complaint at *19, Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829. 
 30. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *3. 
 31. Id. The Supreme Court distinguishes between challenges to the contract in general and challenges 
to the arbitration provision specifically. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006).  
An arbitrator decides challenges to the validity of the contract as a whole and the court decides specific 
challenges to the arbitration clause.  Id. at 444, 449. 
 32. Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *13. 
 33. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 334 (2011). 
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consumer contracts—not employment contracts.34  The district court’s ruling in 
Herzfeld addressed a question left open by the Supreme Court’s ruling in Concep-
cion.  The court in Herzfeld and other federal courts have found that waivers of 
collective arbitration are unconscionable.  This section examines (1) the history of 
the FAA and how the Act impacts arbitration and state law, (2) how the Fair Labor 
Standards Act changes the implications of the FAA, and (3) the current circuit split 
on the unconscionability of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. 
A. Federal Arbitration Act 
The FAA was enacted on February 12, 1925 in response to widespread judicial 
hostility to arbitration agreements.35  The FAA provides that any contract that in-
cludes an arbitration provision is enforceable except where a contract is unenforce-
able by law.36 
The United States Supreme Court held that the FAA was designed “to overrule 
the judiciary’s longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate . . . and place 
such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts.”37  The House Report 
that accompanied the FAA explained Congress’ intention in passing the FAA, 
which was to minimize the costs of litigation and the solution was to make sure than 
arbitration clauses included in enforceable contracts would be upheld and enforce-
able.38  When passing the FAA, Congress was attempting to enforce agreements 
into which parties had willingly entered.39  With the passage of the FAA, issues 
concerning arbitration would be resolved in favor of arbitration and thus would 
eliminate the costs of litigation to determine if arbitration clauses were enforcea-
ble.40 
The FAA is not without its limits, however.  While the Act clearly favors arbi-
tration, it does not require arbitration in all instances.  The FAA only concerns ar-
bitration where parties have agreed to arbitrate, and the Act does not prevent parties 
who have agreed to arbitrate from excluding certain claims from the scope of an 
arbitration agreement.41 
                                                          
 34. Id. at 341. 
 35. Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). 
 36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). “A written provision in any…contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.” Id. 
 37. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (quoting 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 217 (1985)). 
 38. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219-20. “It is practically appropriate that the action should be taken at this time 
when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be 
largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforcea-
ble.”  Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924)). 
 39. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 220. 
 40. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp. 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). The Arbitra-
tion Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues 
should be resolved in favor of arbitration.  Id. 
 41. Volt, 489 U.S. at 511. 
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In general, for a court to exercise jurisdiction under the FAA, a valid arbitration 
agreement arising out of a commerce or maritime transaction must exist.42  How-
ever, as the FAA does not provide an independent basis of federal jurisdiction, a 
federal court must already have subject matter jurisdiction through a source other 
than an arbitration agreement, such as diversity or a claim involving a federal ques-
tion, before the FAA can be applied.43  The Supreme Court has stated that under the 
FAA, an arbitrator will decide a claim unless the arbitration clause itself is at issue.44  
Generally, arbitrators decide challenges to the validity of contracts as a whole and 
courts decide challenges to arbitration clauses.45  Thus to decide whether Herzfeld 
could bring a collective class arbitration claim, the district court looked to Pennsyl-
vania state contract law.46  While the FAA preempts state laws that disallow waivers 
of class actions, the right to collective action is a statutory right guaranteed by the 
Fair Labor Standards Act, which is a federal law. 
B. Fair Labor Standards Act 
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)47 was passed in 1938 and established a 
40-hour workweek, set the national minimum wage, and guaranteed time-and-a-
half pay for overtime hours.48  Congress enacted the FLSA to correct labor condi-
tions found to be “detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living 
that is necessary for health, efficiency, and well being of workers.”49  Under the 
FLSA, employees have the right to bring a collective action against an employer on 
behalf of him or herself and similarly situated employees.50  This guarantee is only 
available to those individuals who are considered employees, not independent con-
tractors.51  The FLSA defines an employee as “any individual employed by an em-
ployer.”52  To determine whether an individual is covered under the FLSA as an 
employee, courts apply an economic reality test, which considers six factors: 
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; 
(2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss; 
(3) the worker’s investment in the business; 
(4) the permanence of the working relationship; 
(5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and 
(6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged em-
ployer’s business.53 
                                                          
 42. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 43. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 44. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445-46 (2006). 
 45. Id. at 445. 
 46. Quilloin v. Tenet Health System Philadelphia, Inc. 673 F.3d 221, 228 (2012) (“State contract prin-
ciples also generally determine whether an arbitration agreement is unenforceable based on any of the 
‘applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.’”). 
 47. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2012). 
 48. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(2) (2012). 
 49. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2012). 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2012). 
 52. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) (2012). 
 53. Baker v. Flint Engineering & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Henderson 
v. Inter-Chem Coal Co., Inc., 41 F.3d 567 (10th Circ. 1994)). 
5
Clark: Stripping Away Employment Rights: The Unconscionability of Class
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
250 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2016 
None of the above factors are by themselves dispositive and courts must em-
ploy a totality of the circumstances approach.54 
The provisions of the FLSA protect individuals classified as employees so em-
ployers who hire independent contractors are not subject to the provisions of the 
FLSA.55  Generally, independent contractors generally have more bargaining power 
than employees and have a greater degree of control over their work hours and 
schedules.56 
Under the FLSA, employees have a statutory right to bring collective action 
suits.57  A collective action under the FLSA differs from a class action within the 
meaning of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.58  In a collective action, 
res judicata extends only to named parties, unlike class actions under Rule 23 where 
res judicata extends to the entire class.59  Members of a class under Rule 23 must 
request exclusion from a lawsuit, or they will be bound by the decision.60  In a col-
lective action, members must file a consent to join a lawsuit, but they are not bound 
by the judgment if they do not consent.61  Courts have treated a collective action 
under the FLSA and a Rule 23 class action as separate causes of action since the 
passage of the FLSA.62 
Although employees have a statutory right to collective action under the FLSA, 
courts have found that the right can be waived.63  Under Pennsylvania law, a waiver 
of a right is the “voluntary and intentional abandonment or relinquishment of a 
known right.”64  To constitute a waiver of a right, there must be a “clear, unequiv-
ocal and decisive act of the party” with knowledge of the right and an “evident 
purpose to surrender” the right.65 
C. Unconscionability 
There is currently a circuit split concerning the unconscionability of arbitration 
clauses in employment contracts.  D’Antuono v. Service Road Corporation, a case 
factually similar to Herzfeld, was decided in 2011.66  However, unlike the Herzfeld 
court, the court in D’Antuono found that the arbitration clause in the Stage Rental 
License agreement was not unconscionable.67  In D’Antuono, three exotic dancers 
filed suit against the Gold Club, the same entity sued in Herzfeld, in the Federal 
District Court of Connecticut.68  The dancers filed suit under the FLSA, asserting a 
                                                          
 54. Id. at 1441. 
 55. Bolduc v. National Semiconductor Corp., 35 F.Supp. 2d 106, 111 (D. Me. 1998). 
 56. Baker, 137 F.3d at 1441. 
 57. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2012). 
 58. Amelia W. Koch, et al., Individualizing the FLSA: Collective Action Waivers and the Split in the 
Federal Courts, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 99, 99 (2012). 
 59. Woods v. New York Life Ins. Co., 686 F.2d 578, 579-80 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 60. Roshto v. Chrysler Corp., 67 F.R.D. 28, 29 (E.D. La. 1975). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Koch, et al., supra note 58, at 99. 
 63. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (citing AT&T Mo-
bility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2011). 
 64. Kamco Indus. Sales, Inc., v. Lovejoy, Inc., 779 F.Supp. 2d 416, 423 (E.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting 
Prime Medical Assocs. v. Valley Forge Ins. Co., 970 A.2d 1149, 1156 (Pa. 2009)). 
 65. Id. at 423 (quoting Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 409 Pa. 357, 360 (Pa. 1962)). 
 66. D’Antuono v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F.Supp.2d 308 (2011). 
 67. Id. at 328. 
 68. Id. at 317. 
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claim of unfair practices because the owners classified the dancers as independent 
contractors instead of employees.69 
1.  D’Antuono v. Service Road Corp. 
The plaintiffs in D’Antuono objected to the arbitration clause in their Stage 
Rental License agreement for three reasons.70  First, the arbitration clause provided 
that entertainers could not bring collective or class arbitration claims.71  Second, the 
clause obtained a cost- and fee-shifting provision requiring the losing party to pay 
for costs incurred for court proceedings and reasonable attorney’s fees.72  Third, 
under the arbitration clause, all claims against the Gold Club had to be filed within 
six months after the dancers’ last day of work.73  The arbitration clause in Herzfeld 
also contained a cost- and fee-shifting provision, but it did not contain an explicit 
provision prohibiting class arbitration.74  The arbitration clause instead stated, 
“[A]ny disputes arising out of this agreement . . . shall be settled by arbitration.”75 
The first issue the court had to address in D’Antuono was whether the plaintiffs 
agreed to arbitration.76  Plaintiffs conceded they signed the Stage Rental License, 
which contained an arbitration clause.77  After determining that plaintiffs had agreed 
to arbitration, the court determined whether the arbitration clause was enforceable.78  
The Gold Club filed a Motion to Dismiss/or Stay the Action.79  After oral argument 
on the motion to dismiss, the district court issued an order that directed the Gold 
Club to give the court a “yes” or “no” answer concerning whether the Gold Club 
intended to enforce the cost- and fee-shifting provision and the statute of limitations 
provision.80  The Gold Club filed notice that it would not enforce either provision 
of the arbitration clause.81 
In Connecticut, an unconscionable contract is one that “no man in his senses, 
not under delusion would make, on the one hand, and which no fair and honest man 
would accept on the other.”82  The contract must be so unfair and unreasonable that 
no reasonable person would willingly enter into the contract.83  Under Connecticut 
law, to succeed on an unconscionability claim the moving party must show that an 
                                                          
 69. Id. at 313. 
 70. Id. at 320-21. 
 71. Id. at 320-22. “Entertainer agrees that all claims between her and the club will be litigated indi-
vidually and that she will not consolidate or seek class treatment for a claim.”  Id. at 316-17. 
 72. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 320-21 (“Any judgment, order, or ruling arising out of a dispute 
between the parties shall award costs incurred for the proceedings and reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”). 
 73. Id. at 321 (“Entertainer further agrees not to commence any action, suit or arbitration proceeding 
relating, in any manner whatsoever, to this lease of the club, more than six months after she last per-
formed at the premises, and further agrees to waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.”). 
 74. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“Licensor and licen-
see shall each pay their own costs and expenses of arbitration including but not limited to their own 
respective attorneys face if any.”). 
 75. Id. at *5. 
 76. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 320. 
 77. Id. at 316. 
 78. Id. at 327. 
 79. Id. at 317. 
 80. Id. at 318. 
 81. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 318. 
 82. Id. at 327. 
 83. Id. 
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absence of meaningful choice existed (procedural unconscionability) and that the 
terms of the agreement were unreasonably favorable toward the other party (sub-
stantive unconscionability).84  A moving party must separately prove both proce-
dural unconscionability and substantive unconscionability to succeed on a claim of 
unconscionability.85  However, in some circumstances, Connecticut courts will find 
a contract is unenforceable on substantive unconscionability alone, even where pro-
cedural unconscionability does not exist.86  By contrast, under Pennsylvania law, 
courts determine unconscionability on a sliding scale.87 
2.  Procedural Unconscionability 
The D’Antuono court found that the plaintiffs could not prove the arbitration 
clause was procedurally unconscionable.88  One of the plaintiffs in D’Antuono did 
not sign a Stage Rental License Agreement, and the court held that she was not 
bound by the arbitration agreement.89  Two of the plaintiffs in D’Antuono argued 
that the arbitration clause was procedurally unconscionable because the clause was 
“hidden in a maze of fine print,” because no effort was made to alert the plaintiffs 
of the clause, and because the parties had unequal bargaining power.90  The court 
disagreed, reasoning that the arbitration clause was written in ordinary size type and 
that it appeared on the same page where both plaintiffs signed their names.91  After 
making that determination, the court addressed the plaintiff’s argument that the con-
tract was presented in a take-it-or-leave-it manner, which was substantially the same 
argument that Herzfeld presented in her case.92 
Some courts have held that the take-it-or-leave-it nature of a contract is per se 
procedurally unconscionable; Connecticut does not have such a rule.93  In D’An-
tuono, the court found that the contract was presented in a take-it-or-leave-it man-
ner, but this was not enough to make the contract procedurally unconscionable.94 
3.  Substantive Unconscionability 
Not only did the court in D’Antuono find that the plaintiffs could not prove the 
contract was procedurally unconscionable, but the court also found that the plain-
tiffs could not prove the contract was substantively unconscionable.95  The court 
first found that plaintiffs did not cite any case in which either the Connecticut Su-
                                                          
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *8 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (“[W]here the proce-
dural unconscionability is very high, a lesser degree of substantive unconscionability may be required 
and presumably vice versa.”). 
 88. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 327-28. 
 89. Id. at 325. 
 90. Id. at 328. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id.; Herzfeld, 2015 WL 4480829, at *9. 
 93. D’Antuono, 789 F.Supp. 2d at 328. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
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preme Court or Appellate Court, applying Connecticut law, struck down an arbitra-
tion clause as substantively unconscionable.96  The only case that the court could 
point to where the Connecticut Supreme Court considered the issue of whether an 
arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable applied New York law.97 
The court further stated that even if the owners of the Gold Club had decided 
to enforce the cost- and fee-shifting and statute of limitations provisions, the provi-
sions of the arbitration clause were not enough to constitute substantive unconscion-
ability.98  The court held that the three provisions of the contract to which plaintiffs 
objected, taken together, were not enough to make the contract unconscionable.99 
4.  Circuit Split 
Of the 13 circuit courts, six have held that agreements that contain a waiver of 
collective action under FLSA are enforceable: First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, 
and Eleventh Circuits.100  Even among these circuits, a split still exists regarding 
what makes a permissible waiver and what level of stringency should be applied.101  
The First Circuit and many district courts in the Second Circuit have decided that 
employers have the burden to prove a permissive waiver occurred.102  The Fourth, 
Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits do not place a high burden on the employer to 
prove a permissive waiver.103  The decision in Concepcion, although it provided 
major support for the FAA, it did not serve a solution to the circuit split. 
D.  AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion 
In 2011, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Concepcion and held that 
arbitration clauses that disallowed class-wide arbitration were not presumptively 
unconstitutional.104  Concepcion however, differs from both Herzfeld and D’An-
tuono in that it involved a consumer contract. 
Vincent and Liza Concepcion bought cell phones from AT&T Mobility that 
were advertised as free.105  The Concepcions were required to pay the sales tax on 
the phones.106  The couple filed a complaint, which was consolidated with a class 
action, for false advertising.107  The contract that the Concepcions signed contained 
an arbitration clause stating all disputes between the parties would be settled via 
arbitration and it required any claim brought by a plaintiff must be settled on an 
individual basis.108  AT&T Mobility filed a motion to compel arbitration.109  The 
district court denied the motion basing its decision on the California rule announced 
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in Discover Bank v. Superior Court.110  In this case, the California Supreme Court 
held that a waiver of class arbitration in a consumer contract of adhesion is uncon-
scionable under certain circumstances and should not be enforced.111  The district 
court denied the motion because AT&T could not prove that the bilateral arbitration 
agreement substituted for the deterrent effects of class actions.112  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed this decision holding that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by 
the FAA.113 
The Supreme Court found that the FAA preempts any conflicting state law that 
prohibits the arbitration of a claim outright.114  The Court found that class arbitration 
could be inconsistent with the FAA for three reasons.115  First, class arbitration nul-
lifies the main advantage of arbitration — its informality — and makes the process 
of arbitration slower and more expensive.116  Second, class arbitration cannot be 
accomplished without procedural formality, which defeats the purpose of arbitra-
tion.117  Third, class arbitration increases risks to defendants because multilayered 
review makes it more likely that errors will go uncorrected.118  The Supreme Court 
found that the Discover Bank rule “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” and thus was preempted 
by the FAA.119 
IV.   INSTANT DECISION 
The district court in Herzfeld addressed Concepcion but ultimately found that 
Concepcion did not address the question before the district court.120  After Herzfeld 
brought suit, the owners of the Gold Club moved to compel arbitration under the 
arbitration clause in the Stage Rental License Agreement.121  The district court 
granted limited discovery on arbitrability.122  The court found that Herzfeld was not 
permitted to arbitrate her FLSA collective action or class action under the 2013 
arbitration clause, but that the loss of the right to arbitrate a collective or class action 
was unconscionable under Pennsylvania contract law.123 
The Third Circuit has held that the district court has the authority to decide if 
an agreement to arbitrate authorizes class arbitration absent “clear and unmistakable 
evidence” to the contrary.124  Under Pennsylvania law, courts have found that ref-
erence to the American Arbitration Association’s rules on collective or class actions 
                                                          
 110. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Ca. 2005) overruled by AT&T Mobility v. Con-
cepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 111. Id. at 114. 
 112. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 343. 
 115. Id. at 348. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348. 
 118. Id. at 349. 
 119. Id. at 350. 
 120. Herzfeld v. 1416 Chancellor, Inc., 2015 WL 4480829, at *10 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
 121. Id., at *2-3. 
 122. Id. at *3. 
 123. Id. at *8, *13. 
 124. Id. at *5 (citing Opalinkski v. Robert Half Intern, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 329 (3d Cir. 2014)). The 
arbitration agreement provided for arbitration of any dispute of a FLSA claim arising out of or relating 
to their employment.  It was silent on the availability of class arbitration.  Consequently, the court of 
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 16
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss1/16
No. 1] Stripping Away Employment Rights 255 
constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to have an arbi-
trator decide whether he or she can resolve a class-wide claim.125  The 2013 arbi-
tration clause in the Stage Rental License Agreement did not reference the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association rules.126  The agreement merely stated that the arbitra-
tion “shall be final and conclusive and binding upon both parties.”127 
Because Herzfeld and the club owner did not clearly and unmistakably agree 
that an arbitrator would decide whether a party could bring a collective or class 
arbitration action, the district court looked to whether a collective or class arbitra-
tion action fell within the scope of the 2013 arbitration clause.128  The clause refers 
to arbitration involving “both parties” and does not make mention of any other par-
ties.129  Thus, the district court found that as a matter of law the 2013 arbitration 
clause did not permit Herzfeld to bring collective or class arbitration action.130 
After determining that the 2013 arbitration clause did not permit Herzfeld to 
bring a class arbitration claim, the court then had to decide whether the arbitration 
clause was unconscionable.131  Under Pennsylvania law, the burden of proof to 
prove that a clause is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable falls on 
the challenging party.132  Courts look to the following factors to determine proce-
dural unconscionability: (1) the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the standardized form 
of the document, (2) the parties’ relative bargaining positions, and (3) the degree of 
economic compulsion motivating the adhering party.133 
The owners of the Gold Club admitted that the 2013 agreement was presented 
in a take-it-or-leave-it fashion.134  The court found that a disparity in bargaining 
power existed between Herzfeld and the Gold Club.135  Herzfeld was a student and 
an exotic dancer at the time.136  While she worked at the club for six years, this was 
not enough to put her on equal bargaining power with the owners of the club.137  
The court found that while evidence of procedural unconscionability existed, pro-
cedural unconscionability was not Herzfeld’s strongest argument.138  Procedural un-
conscionability is sometimes evaluated on a sliding scale dependent on the substan-
tive unconscionability analysis.139  This means that a contract can still be found 
unconscionable even if it is more substantively unconscionable than procedurally 
unconscionable.140 
The court stated that substantive unconscionability refers to terms that are “un-
reasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does 
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not assent.”141  The FLSA provides that a party may bring an action against an em-
ployer on behalf of him or herself or other similarly situated employees.142  The 
court found that the arbitration agreement caused an unknowing loss of Herzfeld’s 
statutory right to collective action.143  To waive her right to collective and class 
arbitration, Herzfeld would have needed to know about the right and there must 
have been a clear showing that she intended to give up that right.144  The arbitration 
clause made a collective or class arbitration action unavailable and as a result im-
posed an involuntary unknowing loss of the right to a class arbitration action.145  
Thus the court found that the arbitration clause was substantively unconsciona-
ble.146 
V.   COMMENT 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion was an important decision in the 
growing trend of courts upholding arbitration agreements in contracts.  The Su-
preme Court concluded that class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts are pre-
sumptively constitutional when it held the FAA preempts state laws that prohibit 
contracts from disallowing class-wide arbitration.147  After this case was handed 
down, the question of whether arbitration clauses in contracts appeared to have been 
finally answered.  However, Concepcion and Herzfeld are distinguishable.  Herzfeld 
and other cases dealing with arbitration clauses in employment contracts concerned 
the FLSA, a federal law, while Concepcion addressed a state law.148  Furthermore, 
the FLSA guarantees employees the right to a collective action on behalf of other 
similarly situated employees.149  The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of 
collective action waivers in employment and lower courts, as in Herzfeld, have at-
tempted to answer this question with little consensus among the circuits. 
Part of the problem facing courts in considering collective action waivers is the 
inconsistency of state unconscionability law.  Under the FAA, an arbitration agree-
ment is not enforceable if the formation of the arbitration agreement is made under 
fraud or duress, or if the terms of the agreement are unconscionable.150  Most em-
ployees challenge arbitration agreements for unconscionability.151  Under an uncon-
scionability analysis, federal courts must interpret state law,152 which results in in-
consistency.  In Herzfeld, the court analyzed procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability on a sliding scale.153  In D’Antuono, the court treated procedural and 
substantive unconscionability as separate prongs of a two-part test.154  The district 
court in D’Antuono mentioned that some courts have held that the take-it-or-leave-                                                          
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it nature of a contract is per se procedurally unconscionable.155  Connecticut does 
not have this rule.156  Prior to the D’Antuono case, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
had only ruled on whether an arbitration clause is substantively unconscionable 
once and the court was interpreting New York unconscionability law and not Con-
necticut unconscionability law.157  Because of this inconsistency, collective action 
waivers should be considered per se unenforceable. 
This approach appears similar to the law that the Supreme Court struck down 
in Concepcion.  However, Concepcion invalidated state laws that prohibited class 
arbitration.  The concerns listed by the Supreme Court are less of an issue under the 
FLSA.  The FLSA grants employees the statutory right to collective action, and 
courts have treated collective and class actions as two separate bodies of law.158  
The right to collective action under the FLSA is not an “opt-in” version of Rule 23 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.159  Collective action would not nullify the 
informality of arbitration, because an arbitrator does not have to adhere to the re-
quirements laid out in Rule 23, but the Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitra-
tions.160  Collective action can be accomplished without procedural formality be-
cause collective actions are less formal than class actions.  Since the passage of the 
FLSA, courts have treated class and collective actions as separate, non-interchange-
able bodies of law.161 
Treating the waiver of collective action as per se unconscionable would elimi-
nate differing court decisions when applying state unconscionability law.  A single 
rule is better for the same reason that courts have upheld consumer agreements pre-
cluding class arbitration under the FAA: efficiency.  There is a split among the cir-
cuits and the Supreme Court should address this issue.  Furthermore, the right to a 
collective action is a remedy under the FLSA.  By allowing a waiver of a collective 
action, an employee is not afforded the full scope of the remedies that Congress 
intended the FLSA to offer.  While courts have favored arbitration, that preference 
should not come at the expense of a statutory right.  Congress passed the FLSA to 
prevent unfair practices in employment.  The waiver of the right to collective action 
is an unfair practice that the FLSA is designed to protect. 
By adopting a bright line rule that the waiver of collective action is per se un-
conscionable, would not render the FAA unenforceable.  In Concepcion, the Su-
preme Court found that the FAA preempts state laws that ban class arbitration pro-
visions that disallow class arbitration.162  Even if we were to completely ignore that 
Concepcion concerned state law rather than a federal law like the FLSA, the FLSA 
and the FAA can still coexist because the FLSA allows for collective action, which 
courts have treated as a separate body of law from class actions. 
Some courts have decided that arbitration agreements can contain a waiver of 
collective action; however, those courts are split on what makes a permissible 
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waiver.163  Should the employee be told that the arbitration agreement includes a 
waiver of collection action?  Should the waiver be in bold print so that it draws the 
employee’s attention to the clause?  What specific language should be included in 
the agreement to constitute a permissible waiver?  Among the circuits that have 
decided that the right to collective action can be waived, there is no consensus.  
While not as extreme as the bright line rule, the circuits who have decided that the 
right to collective action can be waived still have not provided a clear and consistent 
rule as to what constitutes a permissive waiver of a collective action. 
The per se bright line rule would not come without its disadvantages.  As with 
any federal law that might conflict with a state law, there is always the possibility 
of limiting the applicability of state law similar to the decision in Concepcion.  Fur-
thermore, applying a bright line rule in employment contracts could cause potential 
confusion because it does not always provide for exceptions.  In this case, because 
the FLSA provides for collective action as a statutory remedy, the bright line rule 
is appropriate. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
The FAA can preempt state laws that prohibit class-wide arbitration; the ques-
tion still remains whether it can preempt federal laws.  The Herzfeld case presented 
an opportunity to explore enforcement of the FAA in the context of employment 
contracts.  The ruling provided that an arbitration clause is procedurally and sub-
stantively unconscionable when it causes an unknowing loss of a statutory right.  
This case also added to the circuit split regarding whether waivers of collective ac-
tions under the FLSA are unconscionable.  The right to a collective action is a stat-
utory remedy provided under the FLSA.  As the court stated in Herzfeld, an “arbi-
trator cannot offer . . . the full scope of the FLSA remedies in arbitration.”164 
The increasing trend of courts favoring arbitration should not and needs not 
come at the expense of a statutory right.  The FLSA and the FAA can coexist with 
one another.  While a per se bright line rule does not come without its problems, the 
efficiency it will provide outweighs any disadvantages that could arise. 
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